By Paul Eric Teske
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Extra info for After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation
The interest group theory incorporates the strength of interest groups that provide input into the regulatory process from several different angles, the cleavages that develop on key issues, and the coalitions that form along these cleavages. The institutional theory argues that the accountability structure of regulatory institutions constrains the evaluation of interest group inputs and the subsequent decisions. I expect that elements of both explanations are required to explain state telecommunications regulatory choices in the 1980s.
If institutions are completely endogenous, how was the FCC able to oppose the most powerful interest in telecommunications, AT&T, in the 1970s? If so, one may be attributing causation to a intervening, endogenous variable. Therefore, in the quantitative analysis, I will compare onestage regression results with twostage results that treat appropriate institutional factors as endogenous, to perform this test. Thus, institutions can be seen as a mix of interest group coalitions summed over time, with lagging influence, but which develop interests and capabilities of their own.
They hold a wide scope of power that can be utilized aggressively or minimized. The party identification of individual regulators may be too general a measure to influence specific regulatory decisions. These regulatory climate assessments can and do change when new regulators are appointed. Governors prefer to stay away from the "zerosum," highconflict issues that regulators face (Gormley, 1983). Yet, we will see in Chapters 7 and 8, that governors and legislators play a major part in state telecommunications decisions.
After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation by Paul Eric Teske